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Article
WHY THE AIRPORT AND COURTHOUSE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRANT
REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO
SPORTING EVENTS
Benjamin T. Clark*
Attending sporting events is one of America’s favorite pastimes.1
Illegal alcohol consumption and drug use unfortunately are
commonplace at these events.2 Because collegiate games often draw tens
of thousands of fans,3 a greater concern is that one could become the
target of a terrorist attack. Prior to September 11, 2001, courts repeatedly
struck down warrantless searches of patrons entering sporting and other
entertainment events.4 In so holding, courts refused to draw an analogy
between searches at sporting events and warrantless searches that have
been upheld at airports and courthouses.
This Article revisits that analogy and argues that considering the
magnitude and likelihood of the threat, searches of patrons at collegiate
sporting events should be viewed in the same light as airport and
courthouse searches. Stated differently, an exception to the search
warrant requirement should be created for searches of patrons at
sporting events. Part I of this Article explains that sporting events are an

*
Mr. Clark graduated from the University of Iowa College of Law, where he was
elected to the Order of the Coif. He currently practices with Spencer Fane Britt & Browne,
LLP in Kansas City, Missouri. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of
the author.
1
For example, during the 2004 college football season, a total of 4,591,722 fans attended
Big 10 Conference games. Big 10 Home Page, http://bigten.collegesports.com/sports/mfootbl/spec-rel/010605aaa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
2
In the fall of 2000, the author attended all of the University of Iowa home football
games. Fans swilling alcohol out of flasks or other devices during the games was
commonplace.
3
In 2004, the University of Michigan alone averaged 111,025 patrons at its six home
football games. Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1. As explained below, searches of patrons by
public institutions will more likely trigger the state action requirement than searches of
patrons at professional games. Therefore, this Article focuses primarily on collegiate
sporting events.
4
Because case law is relatively sparse with respect to searches at sporting events, this
Article also analyzes case law relating to similar events such as rock concerts. Therefore,
the term “entertainment event” will be used throughout to describe not only sporting
events, but also any other event where thousands of spectators could be present.
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attractive target for terrorists.5 It further explains that because of the
“state action” requirement, public stadiums are often more difficult to
protect from terrorism than private stadiums.6 Part II focuses on what
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, thereby triggering
the warrant requirement.7
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant in
order to conduct a search, Part III explains that courts have tempered
that requirement with narrow exceptions.8 Part III also discusses three
specific exceptions that could apply to warrantless searches of patrons
attending entertainment events.9 Part IV analyzes cases decided both
before and after September 11, 2001, that address the similarities and
differences between airports, courthouses, and sports stadiums.10 Part V
argues that the need for warrantless searches at stadiums is at least
equally, if not more, compelling than warrantless searches at airports
and courthouses.11 Therefore, an exception to the warrant requirement
should be created for stadium searches.
At the outset, it must be noted that the purpose of this Article is not
to stir the emotional debate over an actual or perceived erosion of civil
liberties after September 11, 2001.12 Instead, it is focused on the more
narrow issue of whether, as a matter of fact and law, stadium searches
are sufficiently similar to airport and courthouse searches, such that an
exception to the warrant requirement should be created for searches at
sporting events.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part III.
10
See infra Part IV.
11
See infra Part V.
12
See Bourgeosis v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “September
11, 2001, already a day of immeasurable tragedy, cannot be the day liberty perished in this
country”). To be sure, our civil liberties must be vigilantly protected. Rather than trigger
an emotional debate, this Artcle is intended to create an intellectual discussion on the
applicability of airport and courthouse searches to stadium searches. The discussion is
particularly timely in light of the recently promulgated National Football League search
policy, discussed below.
5
6
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I. SPORTING EVENTS–IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF TERRORISTS
A. An Undeniable Threat
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines terrorism as an
act or acts dangerous to human life that are “intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or
affect the conduct of a government.”13 According to the FBI, sporting
events present a unique and attractive opportunity for both domestic
and foreign terrorists.14 The basis for this conclusion is simple.
To a terrorist, a major sporting event possesses all the desirable traits
of a successful attack. These traits are (1) a soft target, (2) a large number
of Americans, and (3) major media attention.15 With respect to the first
characteristic, a terrorist could surreptitiously smuggle a small amount
of explosive material into a sporting event; indeed, merely 3.5 ounces of
plutonium particles would be enough to kill “concentrations of people
. . . .”16 The number of casualties could be especially high at collegiate
football games, where many schools average more than 100,000
spectators per contest.17
Moreover, it is “not just the huge crowds that gather for games in
America, but the central place sports stands in our culture that makes the
specter of terrorists targeting a major sports event all too alarmingly
logical.”18 “[S]ports [are] a very symbolic target of terrorism because it is
so associated with the globalization of the American economy and the
American culture.”19 “Young kids . . . are wearing those jerseys, they are

13
The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States, Testimony of Dale L. Watson,
Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, FBI, Before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congress02/watson020602.htm.
14
Emergency Survival Program Home Page, ESP Bulletin, www.cert-la.com/ESP/
Terrorism 2001.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
15
Robert Windrem, Athens in the Crosshairs Questions and Answers About Terrorism at the
Olympics (2004), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5674731/.
16
Barry L. Rothberg, Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United
States, 8 DUKE COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 110 (1997).
17
Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1.
18
Windrem, supra note 15; see also Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1080
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing the “logical, concern that public events at which
large crowds gather might be targets of unidentified terrorists”).
19
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 349, 366 (2003).
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wearing their Nike shirts, their Nike shoes, and the terrorists are looking
for a symbol to target.”20
For all these reasons, it should come as no surprise that Al-Qaida has
expressed an interest in attacking “World Cup venues and U.S. sporting
events—big football games.”21 For these reasons, a successful terrorist
attack at such an event would be the crown jewel of any fanatical
individual or group.
B. Stadium Operators Respond to the Threat
Cognizant that sporting events are fertile ground for terrorist acts,
operators of professional22 and collegiate games23 implemented more
rigorous search policies at their events following September 11, 2001.
For example, in August of 2005, the National Football League (“NFL”)
determined that hand searches of all patrons should be required at all
stadiums hosting NFL games during the 2005 season.24 The policy
generally provided that each patron would be subject to a physical patdown as she enters the stadium.25 Any patron that refuses the pat-down
would be denied admittance to the game. The primary intent behind the
NFL pat-down policy was to “prevent terrorists from carrying explosives
into the stadiums.”26 Not surprisingly, the NFL pat-down policy has

Id.
Id.
22
The National Football League’s recently promulgated “pat-down” policy is discussed
in greater detail below.
23
See University at Albany, Ongoing Commitment to Campus Security, http://www.
albany.edu/main/security/questions.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (stating that security
would be increased at public events, including the implementation of metal detectors, patdowns, and the prohibition of bags); see also Graham B. Spanier, President’s Report to The
Pennsylvania State University Board of Trustees, http://www.psu.edu/ur/2001/
bot16novspanier.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (stating new security changes at college
football games, including “no re-entry to the stadium, changed parking and traffic patterns,
barring of knapsacks and bags at games, and a ‘no fly zone’” around the stadium).
24
Tampa Bay Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
25
Id.; see also Kansas City Chiefs Home Page, NFL To Institute ‘Pat-Down’ Policy At Its
Games, http://www.kcchiefs.com/news/2005/09/08/nfl_to_institute_patdown_policy_
at_its_games2/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (“All persons entering Arrowhead [Stadium] will
be subject to and should expect to be patted down by security personnel as they proceed
through the gates.”).
26
Tampa Bay Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078; Kansas City Chiefs Home Page, supra note
25 (recognizing that the NFL pat-down policy “is in recognition of the significant
additional security that ‘pat downs’ offer, as well as the favorable experience that [NFL]
clubs and fans have had using ‘pat-downs’ as part of a comprehensive stadium security
plan”).
20
21
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recently been challenged as unconstitutional.27 Those challenges, which
have found initial success, are discussed in greater detail below.
Importantly, Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches is aimed “exclusively at state action . . . .”28 Stated differently,
the conduct of private parties does not generally implicate the Fourth
Amendment; “only activity by government agents implicates a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights.”29 The constitutionality of the NFL or similar
pat-down policy will therefore often depend on whether a public or
private party is conducting the search.
As a result of the state action requirement, it is often easier for
private entities to conduct warrantless searches without running afoul of
the Fourth Amendment.30 In sharp contrast, public entities generally
cannot conduct searches of patrons unless a warrant is obtained or the
search is deemed reasonable.31 This may leave public stadiums at a
decided disadvantage in protecting its patrons from a terrorist attack.

27
See Tampa Bay Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078; Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.,
No. CGC 05447679, Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Superior
Court for the County of San Francisco, Cal., filed Dec. 15, 2005).
28
United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2003). Whether conduct
constitutes state action is highly dependent on the specific facts at hand. See Gallagher v.
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[a]s is the
case with all of the various tests for state action, the required inquiry is fact-specific”). The
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are discussed in greater detail below.
29
United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
30
The contours of the “state action” requirement have been extensively examined by
courts and commentators alike. This Article does not delve into that murky area of law.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (stating that application of
the state action doctrine “frequently admits of no easy answer”). Instead, the Article will
assume for the purpose of analysis that a search of patrons at a collegiate sporting event
would constitute state action. See Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 F. Supp.
926, 931 (S.D. Iowa. 1977) (holding that because defendants were “acting to provide
security for a public facility financed by pubic monies, the requisite ‘state action’ is
present”). It should be noted that under certain circumstances, and as explained below, a
search conducted by a private professional franchise could also constitute state action.
Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding state action between New
York City and the New York Yankees for many reasons, including the fact that New York
City had paid approximately fifty million dollars to renovate the Yankees’ stadium and
retained the power to approve ticket prices and authorize other entities to use the stadium
when it was not being used by the Yankees); see also Tampa Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078;
Lawrence A. Israeloff, The Sports Fan v. The Sports Team Owner: Does a Franchise’s Prohibition
of Spectators’ Banners Violate the First Amendment?, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 419 (1991)
(discussing the state action doctrine with respect to private sports franchises).
31
Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 (M.D.N.C. 1977). The warrant
requirement is discussed in greater detail below.
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The following examines the requirements imposed on colleges and other
state actors under the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, papers, and effects.
Specifically, it provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.32
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.”33
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,34 Justice Harlan
articulated a two-prong test to determine whether governmental conduct
constitutes a search. He recognized a “twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’”35 This test has become the standard by which most
alleged searches are judged.36

32
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961). Most states have adopted a constitutional provision that is analogous to the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Saurini, 607 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(recognizing that the New York Constitution contains an analogous provision to the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution).
33
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 851 (9th Cir. 2004). As the text itself
demonstrates, the Fourth Amendment regulates only governmental “searches” and
“seizures.” Of course, a search could also involve a seizure of a person. United States v.
Aleman, No. CRIM.A. 05-261, 2006 WL 91777, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2006). For the purpose
of consistency, this Article focuses exclusively on “searches.”
34
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 736, 740 (1979) (recognizing that to determine whether
a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment, “our lodestar is Katz . . . ”).
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A brief discussion of a well-known case illustrates how the Katz test
is applied. In Florida v. Riley,37 Riley lived in a mobile home located on
five acres of rural property.38 Approximately ten to twenty feet behind
the mobile home was a greenhouse.39 Two sides of the greenhouse were
not enclosed, although the contents in the greenhouse were covered from
view from surrounding properties by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home
itself.40 The greenhouse was covered by corrugated roofing panels; some
of the panels were translucent, others opaque.41 Two of the panels,
which constituted approximately ten percent of the roof area, were
missing.42 The mobile home and greenhouse were surrounded by a wire
fence, and a “DO NOT ENTER” sign was posted on the property.43
An anonymous tip to the county sheriff’s office indicated that
marijuana was being grown on Riley’s property.44 However, an
investigating officer could not see the contents of the greenhouse from
the road.45 Not to be deterred, the officer circled twice over the property
in a helicopter at the height of 400 feet.46 With his naked eye, the officer
could see through the openings in the roof and through the open sides of
the greenhouse.47 The officer thought he identified marijuana growing
in the greenhouse.48
Based on the officer’s observations from the helicopter, a search
warrant was issued and a subsequent search confirmed that marijuana
was growing in the greenhouse.49 Riley was charged with possession of
marijuana under Florida law.50 He then filed a motion to suppress,
arguing that the aerial surveillance of his greenhouse constituted a
search.51 Therefore, a search warrant should have first been obtained.52

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

488 U.S. 445 (1989).
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
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The United States Supreme Court rejected that argument. Citing
Katz, the Court first ruled that Riley “no doubt intended and expected
that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the
precautions he took protected against ground-level observation.”53 As a
result, Riley had a subjective expectation of privacy and therefore
satisfied the first Katz prong. Yet, according to the Riley Court, society
was not prepared to recognize his expectation of privacy as reasonable.
Because “‘private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public
airways is routine’ . . . Riley could not reasonably have expected that his
greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a
helicopter.”54 Therefore, because the officer’s actions did not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment, the Riley Court held that a warrant
was not required prior to the aerial surveillance.55
Courts have universally recognized, often with little analysis, that
under Katz and its progeny, patrons at entertainment events have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their persons and in items such as
handbags, purses, and coats.56 The lack of analysis is not surprising. It is
beyond dispute that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with
respect to such items. As a result, any physical inspection of such objects
triggers the protection of the Fourth Amendment.57
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
If the Katz prongs are satisfied, then a search is constitutionally
permissible only if: (1) a search warrant is properly obtained58 or (2) the
Id. at 450. As discussed above, these precautions included a wire fence surrounding
the mobile home and greenhouse, along with a “DO NOT ENTER” sign that was posted on
the property.
54
Id. at 450–51 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
55
Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
56
See, e.g., Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 948 (Haw. 1981) (striking down a search
policy that inspected handbags, coats, jackets, and shoulderbags).
57
State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978); see also United States v. Barth, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (recognizing that “a warrant is usually required to
search the contents of a closed container, because the owner’s expectation of privacy relates
to the contents of that container rather than to the container itself”).
58
The process for obtaining a search warrant is beyond the scope of this Article.
Generally, if a police officer seeks a search warrant, she must establish probable cause to a
magistrate judge. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (defining probable
cause as “[r]easonable grounds for belief that a person should be arrested or searched”). At
that time, the officer must sign an affidavit explaining the basis for her suspicion.
Assuming that the magistrate finds the affidavit persuasive, the search warrant must
outline the specific person or location that may be searched. See generally Rebecca Strauss,
We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches,
100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 879–80 (2002) (describing the process of obtaining a search warrant).
53
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search is reasonable.59 As one court stated: “The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes
those which are unreasonable.”60 Therefore, “warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable.”61 This per se rule is “subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,”62 which
“provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant,
such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of
evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral
magistrate.”63
In carving out exceptions to the warrant requirement, courts
generally engage in a tripartite weighing of public necessity, efficacy of
the search, and degree of the intrusion.64 A non-exhaustive list of
warrantless searches that courts have deemed reasonable include:
consensual searches,65 stop and frisk searches,66 airport and courthouse
searches,67 hot pursuit searches,68 border searches,69 searches incident to
arrest,70 and random drug testing of high school athletes.71
With respect to sporting events, three exceptions to the warrant
requirement could apply that might justify warrantless searches. These
exceptions are: (1) consensual searches, (2) the Terry stop and frisk
search, and most importantly, (3) airport and courthouse searches.
These exceptions are discussed in turn.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
61
Id.; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
62
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
63
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
64
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967) (balancing the need to
search against the invasion that the search entails); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357,
1362–64 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (stating that to determine the reasonableness of a search, a court
should weigh public necessity, effectiveness of the search, and degree of the intrusion).
These three factors are discussed in greater detail below. In all cases, the government bears
the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception. Jacobsen v. City
of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 655 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
65
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
66
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
67
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
68
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
69
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
70
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
71
Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
59
60
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A. Conditional Entry and Implied Consent
If voluntary consent is obtained, the lack of a search warrant is of no
consequence.72 The question of voluntariness depends upon the “totality
of all the surrounding circumstances.”73 Such relevant circumstances fall
into two categories: the external coercion placed upon the individual
and the internal, subjective strength of the individual.74 The external
coercion inquiry focuses on factors such as the number of officers
present, whether the officers are in uniform, and whether the officers
display a weapon.75 The subjective strength of an individual to confer
consent turns on intelligence, age, prior experience with law
enforcement, and knowledge of the right to refuse to give consent.76
Several courts have considered whether a patron consented to a
warrantless search at sporting77 and other entertainment events.78 Two
issues frequently arise in those cases. The first issue is whether
spectators can be required to submit to a search for alcohol, drugs, or
weapons as a condition for entry into the event. The second issue is
whether a patron impliedly consents to a search by seeking admittance
to a sporting event when she is previously notified that she may be
searched prior to entry.
It
access
Gaioni
center

appears well settled that, standing alone, conditioning public
on submission to a search is unconstitutional.79 For example, in
v. Folmar,80 the city of Montgomery, Alabama, opened its civic
to host various public events, such as professional wrestling

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
Id. at 226.
74
Id. at 229 (finding that consent was achieved through subtly coercive police questions
and the vulnerable subjective state of the person).
75
See Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 951 (Haw. 1981) (finding lack of consent where a
patron was approached by a uniformed security guard who stated that he had to inspect
patron’s handbag for bottles or cans).
76
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
77
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 932 F.2d 1160, 1161 (6th Cir. 1991) (examining the policy of
searching racetrack patrons); Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982) (examining the policy of searching patrons at professional football games).
78
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14–15 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (examining the policy of
searching patrons attending rock concerts); Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453
F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (also examining the policy of searching patrons attending
rock concerts); Florida v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (examining the
policy of searching patrons at music festivals).
79
Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1149 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Nakamoto, 635 P.2d at
951–52.
80
460 F. Supp. at 10.
72
73
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matches and rock concerts.81 To curb the illegal use of marijuana and
alcohol by spectators, the city initiated a program to search patrons.82 As
patrons passed through the turnstiles, approximately sixty to seventy
percent were stopped by police.83 The selected ticket holders were
ordered to open their coats, bulging pockets were patted down, and the
contents of pocketbooks were also inspected.84
At one particular rock concert, twenty-two adults were arrested for
drug offenses and twenty juveniles were arrested for possession of
alcohol or marijuana.85 Several individuals subjected to a search filed
suit, alleging that the search policy violated the Fourth Amendment.86
The Gaioni court agreed and struck down the search policy as
unconstitutional.87
The defendants argued that the patrons voluntarily consented to the
search because signs were posted at the entrances warning patrons that
they could be searched.88 The district court flatly rejected this argument,
holding:
[D]efendants cannot condition public access . . . on
submission to a search and then claim those subjected to
the searches voluntarily consented. . . . Any consent
obtained under such circumstances was an inherent
product of coercion, since people undoubtedly felt if
they refused to be searched they would forfeit their right
to attend the concert.”89
Based on Giaoni and similar cases, it appears that a stadium operator
cannot condition a spectator’s admission to a sporting event on consent
90
to a search.
Similarly, courts have skeptically viewed the doctrine of implied
consent as a justification for warrantless searches. To determine whether
patrons impliedly consent to a search, courts generally examine several
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12 n.6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id.
See id.
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factors: (1) whether the patron was aware that her conduct would
subject her to a search,91 (2) whether the search was supported by a “vital
interest,”92 (3) whether the officer possessed apparent authority to
conduct the search,93 (4) whether the patron was advised of her right to
refuse the search,94 and (5) whether refusal would result in a deprivation
of a benefit or a right.95
Applying these factors, courts have repeatedly refused to find
implied consent at entertainment events.96 For example, in Stroeber v.
Commission Veteran’s Auditorium,97 the plaintiffs brought suit alleging
that search procedures conducted at Veteran’s Memorial Auditorium
(“Auditorium”) in Des Moines, Iowa, were unconstitutional.98 Prior to
entering the Auditorium, patrons were not informed that they could be
searched for contraband or other items.99 However, a warning sign was
posted near the doors between the lobby, where tickets were sold, and
the inside foyer, where tickets were taken.100 The sign stated: “It is
illegal to bring a controlled substance or any alcoholic beverages onto
these premises. All persons must be seated in the chairs provided.
Violators will be prosecuted.”101 In addition, a tape recording ran
through the loudspeakers in the lobby area.102 The taped message was
less than one minute long, and it warned patrons that they could be
checked for contraband.103

91
McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
92
Id.
93
Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1147 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
94
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 15 (M.D. Ala. 1978).
95
Id.
96
Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 1977);
Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1976); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385,
387 (Iowa 1978).
97
453 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
98
Id. at 928.
99
Id. at 929.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 929 n.1.
102
Id.
103
Id. In its entirety, the tape recording warned the following:
No alcoholic beverages, pop or controlled drug substances are
permitted to be in the auditorium. No smoking is allowed in the
seating area. Smoking is permitted only in the hallways or restrooms.
For the safety of those admitted to the seating area, you may be
checked to see that these auditorium rules are complied with.
Id. at 930 n.2.
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The defendants argued that patrons impliedly consented to be
searched if they voluntarily entered the Auditorium in spite of the sign
and tape-recorded warning.104 The Stroeber court disagreed, ruling that
“a sign and a tape recording in a crowed and noisy lobby, are
inadequate.”105 The court noted that the sign did not mention a search,
and the tape recording merely mentioned a “check.”106 Also, the sign
and tape recording did not inform patrons that a search could be refused
and that they could, upon refusal, obtain a refund of their ticket price.107
As the policy was applied, “a random number of patrons are suddenly
confronted by armed uniform police officers and told that their
admission to the concert is conditioned upon their submission to a
physical search of their person and personal effects.”108 The court
concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances, which are marked by
coercion and duress, the Court cannot possibly conclude that any
ensuing consent to search was of a voluntary nature.”109
B. Terry Stop and Frisks
On a more limited basis, the Terry stop-and-frisk exception could
also apply to sporting events. In Terry v. Ohio,110 the United States
Supreme Court adopted a flexible standard of reasonableness to
searches. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fourth Amendment:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.111
Under Terry, an officer need not establish probable cause but must be
able “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
Id. at 933.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. Although not expressly stated, it appears the Stroeber court would have rejected
any consent given as coerced, whether express or implied.
110
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
111
Id. at 30.
104
105
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rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.”112 However, to justify a stop-and-frisk search, the search
must focus on a particular individual, and the officer must demonstrate
that there was specific cause for the officer to fear bodily harm.113
Terry has been frequently offered as a justification for warrantless
searches at sporting and similar events. Yet, just as frequently courts
have rejected that justification for two primary reasons.114 First, prior to
the search, the officer lacked an articulable suspicion that the patron was
“armed and presently dangerous.”115 Second, the search policies were
not limited to uncovering lethal weapons.116
For example, in Collier v. Miller,117 the defendants enacted a search
policy to “promote the health and safety of all those involved in any way
with the special events held in Hofheinz Pavillion and Jeppesen
Stadium” on the University of Houston (“University”) campus.118 The
policy prohibited patrons from entering either facility with containers or
packages that could conceal alcoholic beverages, cans, or bottles, unless
the patron allowed the package to be opened and examined.119 If the
patron refused, the University could deny admittance.120 The search
policy was challenged as unconstitutional, and the defendants relied, in
part, on the Terry doctrine.121
Rejecting that argument, the Collier court ruled that in contrast to
Terry, the search policy was not limited to searches for inherently lethal
weapons.122 Instead, “it [sought] to exclude items which could pose a
danger to the public only if misused.”123 The court concluded by
refusing to read Terry to “sanction wholesale searches of the general

Id. at 21.
Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 932.
114
Id.; Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Collier v. Miller, 414
F. Supp. 1357, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
115
Collier, 414 F.Supp. at 1365 (noting that the stadium searches were “conducted without
any basis for suspicion”).
116
Wheaton, 435 F.Supp. at 1146 (noting that “the policy in force at the coliseum is not
limited to searches for inherently lethal weapons”).
117
414 F. Supp. 1357.
118
Id. at 1360.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1364.
122
Id. at 1365.
123
Id. These items included bottles and cans.
112
113

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/7

Clark: Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to the Search Warrant R

2006]

Airports, Courthouses, and Stadiums

721

public in the absence of exigent circumstances, regardless of the
searching official’s valid interest in preventing potential injuries.”124
The case law discussed above demonstrates that courts have
uniformly struck down searches of patrons that were based on consent
or conducted under Terry. However, the airport and courthouse
exception provides more hope in protecting patrons at sporting events.
This exception is discussed below.
C. The Airport and Courthouse Exceptions
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a “wake of
unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy and courtroom
violence.”125 To help curb this violence, courts created an exception to
the warrant requirement that allowed warrantless searches at airports
and courthouses.126 In creating this exception, courts balanced the three
factors of public necessity, efficacy of the search, and the degree and
nature of the intrusion.127 These factors, and how they applied to
airports and courthouses, are discussed in turn.
1.

Public Necessity

The public necessity inquiry examines the nature of the threat to
public safety along with the likelihood that such threat will transpire.128
In airports and courthouses, the nature of the threat to public safety was
significant—death or serious injury to a substantial number of persons
by a bomb or other explosive were distinct possibilities.129 The
likelihood of that threat was also high. In the early 1970s, when the
airport exception was recognized, over 387 attempts were made to hijack
aircrafts.130 Courthouses were also not safe. One court took judicial

Id.
Id. at 1362.
126
Id.; see also United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Downing v.
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972).
127
Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
128
See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering the
constitutionality of airport searches). The United States Supreme Court has considered the
“public necessity” for a warrantless search in several contexts. See Mich. Dep’t of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 453 (1990) (holding that because a temporary checkpoint
was enacted to combat drunken driving, a “serious public danger” of considerable
“magnitude,” it was thus constitutional).
129
Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362.
130
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973).
124
125
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notice131 of widespread violence in courtrooms.132 The threat of death or
serious injury, in conjunction with a high likelihood of its occurrence,
weighed in favor of creating a warrant exception at airports and
courthouses.
2.

The Efficacy of the Search

The efficacy of the search inquiry considers “the likelihood that the
search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm.”133 In
both airport and courthouse searches, a magnetometer is often used to
detect the presence of metal,134 which suggests that an individual could
be carrying a bomb, knife, gun, or other weapon.135 Further, no
particular individual is singled out for a magnetometer search. Instead,
the magnetometer casts a wide net by indiscriminately searching all
persons. In addition, courts have repeatedly recognized that “the
overwhelming majority of weapons will respond to [the]
magnetometer.”136 For all these reasons, courts uniformly found that
magnetometer searches at airports and courthouses were highly effective
in averting physical injuries or death.
3.

The Degree and Nature of the Intrusion

Lastly, the degree and nature of the intrusion on an individual’s
privacy interests are considered.137 This inquiry has a subjective and an
objective component. Subjectively, at airports and courthouses, each
individual must undergo a magnetometer search. Because all persons
are searched, no stigma attaches to embarrass the individual.138 In other
words, no individual is singled out and treated differently based on
color, national origin, appearance, or mannerisms. Moreover, courts
131
A judicially noticed fact is one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned. FED. R. EVID. 201.
132
Downing, 454 F.2d at 1231 n.1 (taking judicial notice of “violent outbreaks across the
country and the consequent dangers and hazards to public property and the Government’s
officers and employees”).
133
Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
134
Courts have repeatedly held that the use of a magnetometer constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing that “the very purpose and function of a magnetometer” is to “search for
metal and disclose its presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy”).
135
United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
136
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974).
137
See Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
138
Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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have ruled that a magnetometer “does not annoy, frighten or humiliate
those who pass through it.”139 Therefore, the nature of the intrusion is
minimal.
Objectively, a magnetometer search is limited in both its scope and
purpose.140 Passing through a metal detector normally takes a matter of
seconds. Unless the metal detector is triggered, the individual is not
detained.141 In addition, the sole purpose of the search is to determine
whether an individual might be carrying a dangerous weapon or similar
object.142 Due to the “absolutely minimal invasion of privacy involved,”
courts repeatedly held that this final factor also weighed in favor of an
exception to the search warrant at airports and courthouses.143
IV. CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
AIRPORTS, COURTHOUSES, AND STADIUMS
Governmental entities and other state actors have often argued that
warrantless searches at stadiums are analogous to warrantless searches
at airports and courthouses.144 To date, that argument has not been wellreceived. Indeed, courts have “uniformly rejected” that analogy.145
However, the vast majority of these cases were decided prior to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The threat of terrorism is now
always present, and an attack on a sporting event is an unfortunate
possibility. 146
Part IV.A examines two cases that were brought prior to September
11, 2001, and that examined a potential analogy between airports,
courthouses, and stadiums.147 The first case is representative of most in

Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771.
141
Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1145; Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981); Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317
N.W.2d 619, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (Wash.
1983) (en banc).
145
WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS & CONFESSIONS ch. 16, § 16.18
(2005).
146
See North Dakota v. Segler, 700 N.W.2d 702, 708 (N.D. 2005) (stating that the State of
North Dakota argued that cases prior to September 11, 2001, are no longer persuasive with
respect to stadium searches because “the country has a greater need for security now than
when [those] cases were decided . . .”).
147
See infra Part IV.A.
139
140
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that it rejects such an analogy.148 The second, an outlier case, recognized
that stadiums are similar to airports and courthouses.149 Consequently,
that court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement at
professional football games.150 Part IV.B examines a recently decided
case that enjoined the NFL pat-down policy from being applied at one
NFL stadium.151 That case is important because it demonstrates that
courts remain reluctant to create an exception for warrantless stadium
searches.152
A. Case Law Addressing the Analogy Prior to September 11, 2001
Jacobsen v. City of Seattle153 is representative of many cases that
refused to extend the airport and courthouse exception to entertainment
events.154 In Jacobsen, there were “frequent violations of the law” at the
Seattle Center Coliseum (“Coliseum”) during rock concerts.155 These
violations included the “throwing of hard and dangerous objects by
some of those attending the concerts.”156 In response, the Seattle Police
Department began conducting warrantless pat-down searches of rock
concert patrons at the Coliseum.157 The searches were designed to
prevent patrons from carrying alcoholic beverages, explosive devices,
weapons, and other dangerous objects.158
At a Grateful Dead concert, the Jacobsen plaintiffs were searched for
contraband.159 They filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and
civil damages, alleging that the warrantless searches were
unconstitutional.160 In response, the defendants did not claim that the
searches were conducted pursuant to Terry or that the patrons consented
to the search.161 Instead, they claimed a “new” exception for rock

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
150
See infra Part IV.A.
151
See infra Part IV.B.
152
See infra Part IV.B.
153
658 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
154
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 13–14 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F.
Supp. 1134, 1145–46 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362–64 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981).
155
Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 654.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 655.
161
Id. at 656.
148
149
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concerts, “asserting that warrantless searches at rock concerts are
analogous to those at courthouses and at airports.”162
The court began its analysis by recognizing that “[t]o determine the
constitutionality of airport and courthouse searches, courts have
considered three factors of public security: efficacy of the search and the
degree and nature of the intrusion involved.”163 With respect to public
security, the court found that although there were serious security
concerns at the Coliseum, “the situations at a rock concert are not
comparable to the dangers posed at airports and courthouses.”164 The
court then quoted Wheaton v. Hagan:165
[T]errorist efforts to bomb courthouses threatened to
undermine the rule of law, while the attempts to blow
up airplanes were often linked to aircraft hijackings. As
unruly as patrons at the Coliseum might have been and
as great a show of violence as might have occurred with
the throwing of a bottle at a performer and the
successful attempt to prevent a policeman from making
an arrest, the dangers posed by these actions are
substantially less than those which justified suspending
the warrant requirement in courthouse and airport
searches. This does not mean that the disruption of
Coliseum events is not a cause for alarm or concern, but
rather to suggest that other less constitutionally
questionable actions should be employed to control the
behavior of those attending activities at the Coliseum.166
Inexplicably, the Jacobsen court failed to analyze the efficacy of the
search. Namely, the court did not discuss whether violence or illegal
acts were curtailed as a result of searches at the Coliseum. Instead, the
court focused on the degree and nature of the search. The court ruled
that “in contrast to the high degree of intrusion in the pat-down frisk
employed by the Seattle police, both airport searches which are
conducted with a magnetometer and courtroom searches which employ

162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id.
435 F. Supp. 1134, 1134 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 7

726

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

a brief stop and a visual examination of packages, pocketbooks, and
briefcases are far less intrusive.”167
After making these findings, the court struck down the searches as
unconstitutional.168 In so holding, the court found that the searches “are
not analogous to airport or courthouse searches nor do they come under
any other exception to the warrant requirement . . . .”169 “No special
exemption from constitutional protections should be made for rock
concerts or other gatherings in public arenas.”170
In contrast, one outlier case prior to September 11, 2001, did
recognize an analogy between airport and courthouse searches and
stadium searches. In Jensen v. City of Pontiac,171 Jolynne Jensen attended a
professional football game at the Pontiac Silverdome (“Silverdome”).
Before she passed through the turnstile at the entrance of the stadium,
she was stopped by a uniformed stadium security guard.172 The guard
requested that Jensen open her purse, and she complied.173 The guard
then visually inspected the contents of her purse; however, the guard did
not physically touch Jensen or her purse.174
The search of Jensen’s purse was conducted pursuant to a search
procedure initiated for all events at the Silverdome. The procedure was
primarily designed to protect both spectators and performers from injury
due to thrown projectiles.175 Prior to entering the turnstile, a guard could
stop any person carrying a container large enough to carry bottles, cans,
or “other missile-like objects of similar size.”176 If stopped, the guard
would ask the patron for permission to visually inspect the container.177
The patron would be informed that she could refuse inspection.178 If
permission was refused, the patron was given the option of disposing of
the container, after which admission would be allowed.179 If the patron
refused to allow visual inspection or refused to dispose of the container,
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
317 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
172
Id. at 620.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. A secondary purpose was to comply with a Michigan law, which required that
only alcoholic beverages bought on the premises could be consumed there. Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 620.
179
Id.
167
168
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admission to the event was denied.180 The patron could then receive a
refund of her ticket price.181
A four-foot by four-foot sign was posted at each gate into the
stadium.182 The sign stated:
NOTICE: FOR YOUR PROTECTION BOTTLES, CANS,
LIQUOR CONTAINERS, HORNS OR OTHER MISSLE
[sic]-LIKE OBJECTS ARE NOT PERMITTED IN
STADIUM. PLEAS [sic] RETURN SUCH ITEMS TO
YOUR VEHICLE. PATRONS SUBJECT TO VISUAL
INSPECTION OF PERSON, PARCELS, BAGS AND
CONTAINERS OR CLOTHING CAPABLE OF
CARRYING SUCH ITEMS. PATRONS MAY REFUSE
INSPECTION. IF SO, MANAGEMENT MAY REFUSE
ENTRY.183
Jensen did not allege mistreatment during her search.184 Instead, she
sought a declaratory ruling that the Silverdome’s search policy was
unconstitutional.185 The Michigan Court of Appeals did not oblige, and
it upheld the warrantless search policy.186
The court began its analysis by considering the “three factors which
courts have relied upon in determining that warrantless searches in
airports and courthouses are constitutional: (1) the public necessity, (2)
the efficacy of the search and (3) the degree and nature of the intrusion
involved.”187 With respect to public necessity, the evidence established
that football games at the Silverdome encouraged violence in the stands
and that the violence varied with the team’s performance.188 Moreover,
the search policy was enacted in response to “widespread injuries to
patrons which occurred as a result of thrown objects.”189 In that regard,
the court recognized that the “seating arrangement at football games”

Id.
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 624.
187
Id. at 622.
188
Id. at 623. In limiting its holding to football games, the court specifically noted that
there was a lack of public necessity to justify warrantless searches at other events, “such as
antique car shows, tractor pulls and dog shows.” Id. at 623 n.3.
189
Id. at 623.
180
181
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created a “unique problem in that objects thrown from seats above gain
potentially fatal velocity and nearly always strike an unsuspecting
patron in the head or shoulder region.”190 Although the “injury being
protected against occurs to individual patrons one at a time rather than
the spectacular catastrophes possible in airplane bombings . . . the injury
is still potentially fatal and always as unexpected.”191 Consequently,
“[t]here is then a necessity, recognized by this [c]ourt and we believe the
general public, to protect patrons at a public stadium from the harm
inflicted by unknown assailants throwing container-type objects.”192
The court next examined the efficacy of the search policy. Here, the
plaintiff admitted that after the policy’s implementation, the number of
injuries declined.193 Further, the policy required every patron to be
searched.194 The court ruled that this “nondiscretionary procedure
should be very effective in stopping the flow of missile-like containers
into the Silverdome.”195
Finally, the court balanced the public necessity and efficacy of the
search with the degree and nature of the intrusion involved. In terms of
the degree of the invasion, the patrons were told that they did not have
to submit to the search and could instead obtain a refund of their ticket
price.196 Moreover, the policy only called for guards to visually inspect
the patrons and their property.197 Although the patrons could be asked
to move items within their containers to facilitate inspection, the guards
were specifically instructed not to physically touch patrons or their
belongings.198 Under these facts, the court found the degree of the
invasion minor, especially when compared with other search policies
where patrons were physically patted down.199
The court similarly found that the nature of the search was
insignificant.200
As all patrons were subject to a search, the

Id.
Id. at 623–24.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. (citing several cases, including Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C.
1977), where the searches were struck down as unconstitutional).
200
Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 624.
190
191
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“objectionable discretion element is thereby removed . . . .”201 Because
no individual was singled out, no stigma would attach to the searched
individual.202 After balancing all three factors, the court held that the
search policy was “constitutional as applied to professional football
games.”203
B. Case Law Revisiting the Analogy After September 11, 2001
After September 11, 2001, few reported cases have revisited the
analogy between searches at stadiums and airports and courthouses.
The cases that have been reported were decided very recently and
address the newly promulgated NFL pat-down policy described above.
One such case is Tampa Sports Authority v. Johnston.204
In Tampa Sports Authority, the plaintiff Gordon Johnston was a
Tampa Bay Buccaneers (“Buccaneers”) season ticket holder.205 Johnston
renewed his season tickets in spring of 2005 for the 2005 football
season.206 Upon renewal that spring, Johnston was not informed that he
would be subjected to a pat-down search prior to entering Raymond
James Stadium, home of the Buccaneers.207
The Tampa Sports Authority (“TSA”) was created by Florida law to
maintain sports facilities for the residents of Tampa and Hillsborough
County, Florida.208 Accordingly, the TSA maintains Raymond James
Stadium.209 Raymond James Stadium is a publicly owned stadium and
has a capacity of 65,000.210
As explained above, in August of 2005, the NFL created a pat-down
policy, which provided that all patrons must be physically searched
before entering any NFL game.211 The pat-down policy was designed in
part to “prevent terrorists from carrying explosives into the stadiums.”212
The Buccaneers requested that the TSA adopt the NFL policy at

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Id.
Id.
Id.
914 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Raymond James Stadium.213 The TSA complied and adopted the patdown policy on September 13, 2005. 214
When Johnston learned of the policy, he contacted the Buccaneers to
complain about it.215 The Buccaneers informed Johnston that he could
not receive a refund for his season tickets.216 He was also told that even
if a refund was possible, he would be placed at the end of a “100,000person waiting list” should he wish to purchase future season tickets.217
In response, Johnston filed an emergency request for a preliminary
injunction in Florida state court.218 In his motion, Johnston argued that
the warrantless pat downs, without the support of any particularized
suspicion, violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.219 Specifically, he stated in part that “NFL fans should not be
forced to abandon their constitutional rights at the stadium gate under
the dubious guise of security.”220
To decide whether Johnston was entitled to an injunction, the trial
court weighed four factors as required by Florida law: (1) the likelihood
of irreparable harm, (2) the lack of an adequate remedy at law, (3) the
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) whether the
public interest would be served by granting the injunction.221
The trial court first found that Johnston would suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.222 Specifically, the court
noted that Johnston was not provided notice of the pat-down policy until
after he paid for his season tickets.223 When Johnston learned of the
policy and complained about it, the Buccaneers refused to give him a
refund.224 Under these circumstances, the trial court found that
Id.
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Johnston v. Tampa Bay Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Emergency Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Hillsborough County, Fla.
2005).
221
See, e.g., Charlotte County v. Vetter, 863 So. 2d 465, 468–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
222
See id. at 469.
223
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 2 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
224
Tampa Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078 (describing the factual background presented in
the lower court).
213
214
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“Johnston will be irreparably harmed if TSA continues its policy of
requiring these pat-down searches because (as explained later), he will
be forced to undergo a search in violation of his Florida constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable government-directed searches.”225
The court next found that Johnston did not have an adequate
remedy at law.226 In that regard, the court summarily found that money
damages could not compensate Johnston for invading his right to be free
from unconstitutional searches.227
The court’s third and most important consideration was whether
Johnston had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim.228 TSA presented a number of arguments to establish that
Johnston’s constitutional claim was without merit.229 TSA initially
argued that it is not a state actor and therefore not restricted by the
Florida Constitution.230 However, the court noted that TSA was a public
agency, created by the Florida legislature “for the purpose of planning,
developing, and maintaining a comprehensive complex of sports and
recreation facilities for the use and enjoyment of the citizens of Tampa
and Hillsborough County, as a public purpose.”231 Further, although a
private security company performed the searches, the searches were
conducted under the direction and at the behest of TSA.232 The patdown policy was also funded by taxpayer dollars.233 Under these
circumstances, the trial court concluded that TSA was a state actor.234
The court next noted that Article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution provides the same protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures as the U.S. Constitution.235 The court easily concluded that
Johnston had a reasonable expectation of privacy in avoiding the search,
stating that “[e]ven if Mr. Johnston might be inadvertently jostled by
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 2 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 3–7.
230
Id. at 3.
231
Id. (quoting Florida v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 1966)).
232
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 3–4 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
233
Id. at 4.
234
Id. (citing Florida v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
off-duty officers that were hired by and for the benefit of a private party were state actors).
235
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 5 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
225
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other football fans while entering the gate, he still retains an expectation
of privacy in not being forced to subject his person to unwanted
intentional touching by state actors.”236
Because the pat-down searches were unaccompanied by a warrant,
TSA bore the burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant
requirement applied.237 TSA primarily argued that special circumstances
justified the use of pat-down searches at Buccaneers games.238
Nonetheless, the court found that “no special circumstances exist.”239
Specifically, the court noted the lack of a “particularized threat” to
Raymond James Stadium.240 The evidence of such a threat included a
telephone call to TSA approximately two years before institution of the
pat-down policy.241 TSA did not institute a pat-down policy upon
receipt of that threat, and after an investigation, the threat was deemed
not credible.242
TSA also presented evidence that downloaded images of two
stadiums, neither of which was Raymond James Stadium, were
discovered on computers possibly linked to terrorists.243 The court
discounted that evidence, noting that the FBI Field Office in St. Louis,
Missouri, found that the downloads were not a threat or even a potential
threat.244 The final piece of evidence presented by TSA was that
terrorists would like to target NFL games because they are an “American
icon.”245 Again, the court found that such evidence did not amount to a
“particularized threat.” 246
Finally, the court found that the public interest would be served by
preventing future unreasonable searches.247 In that regard, the court

Id.
Id.
238
Id. It appears that the court was addressing TSA’s analogy between pat-down
searches at stadiums and airport and courthouse exceptions. However, the court did not
expressly recognize that it was addressing such an analogy.
239
Id.
240
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 5 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 6.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 7.
236
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stated that “September 11 is a tragedy, but it does not mean that the
Constitution needs to be torn up and thrown out the door.” 248
TSA immediately appealed the trial court’s decision, and under
Florida law, the appeal automatically stayed the preliminary
injunction.249 On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals refused to reverse
the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.250
V. PROPERLY BALANCING THE RELEVANT FACTORS DEMONSTRATES THAT
AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE CREATED FOR

STADIUM SEARCHES
The court in Tampa Sports Authority erroneously failed to recognize
the distinction between warrantless searches conducted before and after
September 11, 2001.
Unlike the Tampa Sports Authority court’s
conclusion, the balancing of public necessity, efficacy of the search, and
degree and nature of the intrusion at a sporting event should look much
differently today than the cases prior to September 11, 2001, discussed
throughout this Article. The following examines these three factors and
demonstrates that airports, courthouses, and sporting events are
sufficiently similar to justify an exception to the warrant requirement at
stadiums.

Id.
Tampa Sports Auth v. Johnston., 914 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310(b)(2) (providing that a preliminary injunction is automatically stayed
upon the filing of a notice of appeal)).
250
Id. The Court of Appeals lifted the automatic stay on November 4, 2005, and
explained its reasons in an order dated November 30, 2005. Id. Although a detailed
analysis of the appellate court’s ruling is not necessary, its opinion contains several
contradictory comments that are worth noting. As with the trial court, the appellate court
was troubled by the “amorphous nature of the present danger to the stadium.” Tampa
Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1080. However, the court also recognized that the pat-down
policy was enacted in response to a “certainly logical, concern that public events at which
large crowds gather might be targets of unidentified terrorists.” Id. The appellate court
further noted that TSA submitted expert affidavits providing that pat-down searches were
the most effective way to detect suicide bombs. Id. at 1081. The court further recognized
that “[c]onducting patdown searches may well be effective for detecting arms or
explosives.” Id. Nonetheless, because TSA did not adopt the pat-down policy until two
years after a specific threat to Raymond James Stadium, the court ruled that maintaining
the stay would not be detrimental to TSA. Id. The court bolstered that conclusion by
recognizing that “the TSA has in place a number of other measures to protect against a
variety of security threats . . . .” Id.
248
249
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A. The Pubic Necessity for Searches at Stadiums is at Least as Strong, if not
Stronger, than the Public Necessity for Searches at Airports and
Courthouses
As an initial matter, it must be recognized that many cases prior to
September 11, 2001, struck down stadium search policies designed to
eradicate alcohol or drugs, not bombs or other explosive devices.251
Although alcohol and drugs were often illegal at those events, they
“present[ed] no public danger equivalent to that posed by a bomb or
gun.”252 Thus, courts held that the “[public] necessity for the . . . searches
is minimal compared to that for airport searches.”253 Under this
reasoning, a stadium search conducted with the express purpose of
eliminating bombs or other weapons of mass violence should be viewed
in a more favorable light. Moreover, and as discussed throughout this
Article, the vast majority of cases examining the constitutionality of
stadium searches were decided before September 11, 2001. After that
date, governmental entities have repeatedly stressed a greater need to
conduct stadium searches.254 For these reasons, modern courts should
not rely heavily on stadium cases decided before September 11, 2001.
The public necessity inquiry considers the nature of the threat
involved along with the likelihood that the threat will materialize.255 The
nature of the threat at airports and courthouses was a matter of life and
death, and the likelihood of that threat transpiring was high. “The
nature of the threat necessitating airport and courtroom searches is death
or serious injury to a number of citizens caused by inherently lethal
weapons or bombs.”256 In the early 1970s, when the airport exception
was recognized, there had been 387 aircraft hijacking attempts.257 With
respect to courthouses, one court took judicial notice of widespread
violence in courtrooms.258

251
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 13 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (striking down search policy
designed to uncover drugs and alcohol).
252
Id. at 14.
253
Id.
254
See North Dakota v. Segler, 700 N.W.2d 702, 708 (N.D. 2005) (stating that the State of
North Dakota argued that cases prior to September 11, 2001, are no longer persuasive with
respect to stadium searches because “the country has a greater need for security now than
when [those] cases were decided . . .”).
255
Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
256
Id.
257
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973).
258
Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231 (6th Cir. 1972).
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At sporting events, the nature of the threat is even greater than at
airports or courthouses. Hundreds of individuals may be found at a
particular courthouse or on a particular flight. Compare that to the tens
of thousands of fans that pack sports stadiums for any given event. The
number of individuals in harm’s way at a sporting event simply dwarfs
the number of individuals present at any particular airplane or
courthouse. For example, in 2004, the Big Ten Conference averaged
69,572 patrons per football game.259 Warrantless searches at airports and
courthouses were upheld, in part, to protect a tiny fraction of the number
of individuals that could be killed or injured at a sporting event.
Therefore, the nature of the threat at stadiums is greater than the nature
of the threat at airports and courthouses.
The similar nature of the threat at airports, courthouses, and
stadiums does not end with potential death or injuries. In both contexts,
an attack could be carried out with little warning or planning. For
example, in recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement at
airports, one court noted that “modern technology has made it possible
to miniaturize to such a degree that enough plastic explosives to blow up
an airplane can be concealed in a toothpaste tube.”260 Commentators
have similarly recognized that “3.5 ounces of plutonium particles would
be enough to kill . . . concentrations of people at sporting events.”261 The
ease with which an attack could be carried out is another similarity
between airports, courthouses, and stadiums.
The psychological make-up of those involved with airport and
courthouse attacks is also strikingly similar to terrorists who may want
to attack a sporting event. In the airport context, one court recognized
that “[m]any hijackers have been psychotic or political fanatics, for
whom death holds no fear and little consequence.”262 “Unlike most
other crimes, hijacking is one in which secrecy is not a principal concern.
Once the hijacker decides to act, he doesn’t care if there are numerous
witnesses.”263 These courts accurately described the terrorists who
attacked on September 11, 2001, and similarly described those who
would likely want to carry out an attack at a sporting event. For all these

259
Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1. In addition, an average of 5,154 fans attended each
NCAA Division I basketball game. NCAA Home Page, www.ncaa.org/stats/m_basketball
/attendance/2004_basketball_attend.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
260
Moreno, 475 F.2d at 49.
261
Rothberg, supra note 16, at 110.
262
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974).
263
Moreno, 475 F.2d at 49.
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reasons, the nature of the threat at stadiums is as serious, if not more
serious, than the nature of the threat at airports and courthouses.
The next inquiry is the likelihood of the threat at stadiums. There
has not yet been an attack at a sporting event. The Tampa Bay Authority
trial and appellate courts relied heavily upon that fact in upholding a
preliminary injunction against the NFL pat-down policy. The trial court
in Tampa Bay Authority stressed the lack of a “particularized threat to
[Raymond James Stadium],”264 and the appellate court similarly noted
the “amorphous nature of the present danger to the stadium.”265 With
respect to the likelihood of the threat, the Tampa Sports Authority courts
are misguided for at least two reasons.
First, stadium operators should not be forced to demonstrate that
their specific stadium is under a specific threat. It should, at the very
least, be sufficient to demonstrate a substantial threat generally exists at
sporting events. By requiring greater specificity, the Tampa Bay Authority
trial court, and others, have disregarded United States Supreme Court
precedent to the contrary.
For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,266 the
United States Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s warrantless sobriety
checkpoint program.267 In describing the magnitude and likelihood of
the threat, the Court did not cite drunk driving statistics for the State of
Michigan. Nor did it cite even more location-specific data, such as drunk
driving statistics for individual counties within the state. To the
contrary, the Court cited national drunk driving statistics, stating that
“[d]runk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the
same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than
five billion dollars in property damage.”268 It therefore appears unlikely
that the United States Supreme Court would require a specific threat to a
specific stadium as demanded by Tampa Sports Authority. Indeed,
knowledge of a specific threat to a specific stadium may not be known
until an attack has occurred or was attempted. Because the trial court in
Tampa Sports Authority began its analysis under a faulty premise, it is not
surprising that it arrived at an erroneous conclusion.
264
See Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s
Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 5 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2,
2005).
265
Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
266
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
267
Id. at 455.
268
Id. at 451.
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Second, it is true that the likelihood of the threat at stadiums is not as
concrete as the threat at airports and courthouses. Unlike airports and
courthouses, a sporting event has fortunately yet to be attacked.
Nonetheless, at least one court has recognized the “certainly logical . . .
concern that public events at which large crowds gather might be targets
of unidentified terrorists.”269 Also, as stated above, commentators have
similarly stressed that a sporting event would be a “very symbolic target
of terrorism.”270 Al Qaida itself has expressed an interest in attacking
American sporting events.271
Under these circumstances, the likelihood of the threat at sporting
events is not simply theoretical or amorphous. It is real and substantial.
However, the majority of courts would appear to require that an attack
actually materialize before acknowledging the likelihood of the threat at
stadiums. That approach is misguided and reckless. The substantial
threat should be recognized before thousands of innocent spectators are
harmed, not after. Of course, September 11, 2001, does not mean that the
“Constitution needs to be torn up and thrown out the door.”272
However, our Constitution should not turn a blind eye to the threat at
major sporting events. For all these reasons, the public necessity for
stadium searches is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the public
necessity for searches at airports and courthouses.
B. Stadium Searches Can Be as Effective as Those at Airports and Courthouses
The second prong of the balancing test considers “the likelihood that
the search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm.”273
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, the burden of
establishing the efficacy of the search is not onerous. For example, in
Sitz,274 approximately 1.6 percent of the motorists driving through a
warrantless sobriety checkpoint were arrested for driving under the
influence.275 The United States Supreme Court held that such a
percentage was sufficiently effective to justify the warrantless seizure
created by the checkpoint.276

Tampa Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1080.
Fallon, supra note 19, at 366.
271
Windrem, supra note 15.
272
Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 7 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005).
273
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
274
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
275
Id. at 455.
276
Id.
269
270
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At stadiums, lower courts have subsequently required a much
higher rate of effectiveness. For example, in Gaioni, the court stated that
while the defendant did seize some contraband, drug and alcohol use at
the stadium was “not eliminated.”277 Under Gaioni, a search policy is not
effective unless it eliminates all weapons or other contraband. That
unduly stringent standard should be rejected at stadiums for many
reasons, not the least of which is that it is irreconcilable with United
States Supreme Court precedent.278
Because the threshold for deeming a search “effective” is low,
properly implemented pat-down searches at stadiums can be as effective
as searches at airports and courthouses. In Tampa Sports Authority, the
stadium operator presented affidavits from experts providing that patdown searches are “the most effective means of detecting suicide
bombs.”279 Based on those affidavits and other evidence, the appellate
court recognized that “[c]onducting patdown searches may well be
effective for detecting arms or explosives.”280 Accordingly, pat-down
searches at stadiums should be an effective way to filter out dangerous
weapons and explosives.
Alternatively, a magnetometer is commonly used at airports and
courthouses to detect the presence of weapons, and is able to detect the
“overwhelming majority of weapons . . . .”281 In addition, magnetometer
searches have effectively deterred future crimes. As one court stated,
“[o]ne of the prime purposes of the search . . . is deterrence, the
knowledge that such searches are conducted acting to deter potential
hijackers from even attempting to bring weapons on a plane.”282
At stadiums, a magnetometer search could be implemented in a
manner similar to airports and courthouses. Indeed, the magnetometer
has already been used at high-profile games after September 11, 2001.

277
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978). Despite using broad language,
the Gaioni court was probably not requiring a 100% success rate before a search policy
could be deemed “effective.” Yet, the case law indicates that courts are unduly critical
when considering whether a search policy is effective at entertainment events. Nakamoto
v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981).
278
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 553 (1976) (holding “effective”
a permanent checkpoint designed to detect illegal aliens with a 0.5% illegal-alien detection
rate).
279
Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
280
Id.
281
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974).
282
Id.
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For example, metal detectors were used at the 2002 Super Bowl.283 If
metal detectors are used at a sporting event, courts should recognize that
they are as effective as at airports and courthouses. Specifically, searches
by way of metal detectors would detect the “overwhelming majority of
weapons . . . .”284 They would also deter potential wrongdoers from
even attempting to enter the stadium with explosives or other objects.
A metal detector search, however, may not be the ideal solution.
With thousands of spectators entering a stadium, a metal detector search
could be “impractical under certain circumstances . . . in terms of
backing them all up in long lines . . . .”285 More importantly, “the
terrorists know, as we know from September 11th, that they do not need
to bring any metal. So they [could] bring a plastic device [in the
stadium].”286 Indeed, a growing concern is that a terrorist could smuggle
in “large amounts of C4 plastic strapped to their bodies.”287
Consequently, and as explained below, a pat-down search may be the
most effective and efficient way to ferret out plastic explosives.
C. Stadium Searches Must Necessarily Be More Intrusive than Searches at
Airports and Courthouses
The final factor that must be balanced is “the degree and nature of
intrusion into the privacy of the person and effects of the citizen which
the search entails.”288 As explained above, this factor contains an
objective and subjective inquiry. The degree of “‘objective’ intrusion . . .
[is] measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the
investigation.”289 The subjective inquiry considers the “fear and surprise
engendered in law–abiding [individuals] by the nature of the stop.”290
As explained throughout, stadium searches are designed to discover
the same type of nefarious objects as those sought at airports and
courthouses. A stadium search “entails a search of the person and his
effects. In this respect [a stadium search] is similar to airport and
courthouse or courtroom searches.”291 Therefore, the degree and nature

283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Fallon, supra note 19, at 370.
Albarado, 495 F.2d at 804.
Fallon, supra note 19, at 398.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
Id. at 452.
Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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of the intrusion of the search is similar at airports, courthouses, and
stadiums.
That said, a pat-down search is more invasive than a magnetometer
search. However, to detect plastic explosives and similar objects, patdown searches at stadiums could be a necessary evil. As stated above,
terrorism experts have opined that “patdown searches [are] the most
effective means of detecting suicide bombs.”292 Consequently, a patdown search policy is the best vehicle to detect the presence of
explosives.
Despite the utility of pat-down searches, prior to September 11, 2001,
courts repeatedly struck down such searches of patrons at stadiums.293
At least one recent case has similarly found that pat-down policies at
stadiums are too intrusive to be upheld as constitutional.294 To help
lessen the degree and nature of the intrusion of a pat-down search, the
following factors should be considered when promulgating or amending
a stadium search policy.
First, courts have held that when a search policy is applied
indiscriminately, and therefore not directed at isolated spectators, no
stigma attaches to embarrass the individual subjected to the search.295
Accordingly, any stadium pat-down policy should be applied
indiscriminately to each patron. The NFL pat-down policy is not
selective; each patron must consent to the pat-down prior to admittance.
Each patron can therefore “see that [other patrons are being searched],
he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”296 The Tampa Sports
Authority court completely ignored the indiscriminate nature of the NFL
pat-down policy; other courts should not duplicate that mistake.
Although potentially time-consuming,297 a pat-down stadium search
should therefore be applied indiscriminately.

Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
See, e.g., Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 949 (Haw. 1981) (striking down a search
policy involving “actual physical inspections”).
294
State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 709 (N.D. 2005) (stating that a pat-down search at a
University of North Dakota hockey game was “very intrusive”).
295
See, e.g., Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656–57 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
296
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (recognizing that subjective fear is minimal at a sobriety
checkpoint because each motorist is briefly stopped).
297
Stadium Pat-Downs Nixed, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://news.
enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2005510010361&template=printpicart
(stating
292
293
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Further, if a pat-down policy is struck down as too invasive, stadium
operators may wish to consider a mere visual inspection. 298 Courts have
upheld search policies where the patrons are “asked to move items
within their containers to facilitate complete visual inspections.”299 That
said, and as explained throughout, pat-down searches are one of the few
ways to detect the presence of plastic explosives, especially if strapped to
the body of a terrorist.
After balancing all the relevant factors, an exception to the warrant
requirement should be recognized for stadium searches. The public
necessity for stadium searches is as strong, if not stronger, than the
public necessity for airport and courthouse searches. Further, stadium
searches can be as effective as airport and courthouse searches in
filtering out dangerous weapons or explosives. Finally, if appropriate
measures are taken, the degree of the instrusion at stadiums can be
reduced.
D. Alternatives to Warrantless Searches at Stadiums
If courts refuse to recognize an exception for stadium searches, other
safety procedures could be implemented. In this regard, courts have
suggested several constitutional means to achieve the desired end. All
backpacks, parcels, or bundles larger than a particular size could be
prohibited from the arena.300 A checkroom could be provided for such
parcels and other objects, and the stadium could charge a fee to cover the
cost of operating the facility. This prohibition could deter terrorists from
attempting to smuggle explosives or other dangerous weapons into a
stadium. Also, more effective policing should be maintained inside the
stadium.301 Additional security guards patrolling the facility may catch
perpetrators in the act, providing probable cause or particularized
suspicion sufficient for a Terry frisk. One or more of these safeguards,
although not as effective as a pat-down, could help protect spectators.
VI. CONCLUSION
When presented with the issue, courts should recognize that
warrantless searches at stadiums are sufficiently analogous to

that the application of a pat-down policy on all fans at Cincinnati Bengals football games
would “create havoc” around kickoff).
298
Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
299
Id. at 624.
300
Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1148 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
301
Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 657 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
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warrantless searches at airports and courthouses. Indeed, because
thousands more people are at risk at stadiums than at airports or
courthouses, the need for such stadium searches may be greater.
Because of this need and the similarities between airports, courthouses,
and stadiums, courts should create an exception to the warrant
requirement for stadium searches.
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